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THE PEOPLE, THE SENATE AND THE 
COURT: THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF 
THE JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION 
SYSTEM 
Mark Silverstein* 
In January of 1932, following the retirement of Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, President Herbert Hoover announced to all con-
cerned that he would seek a moderate Republican to replace 
Holmes on the Court. A groundswell of support, however, quickly 
developed for Benjamin Cardozo, a Democrat and the respected 
Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals. The President nev-
ertheless remained adamant; the appointment of Cardozo would 
bring a third New Yorker and a second Jew to the Court. More-
over, Holmes had already achieved almost mythical status as the 
voice of progressive and realistic jurisprudence and Hoover had lit-
tle inclination to appoint a justice sure to follow in the Holmes tra-
dition. The possibility of a Cardozo nomination appeared doomed 
until William E. Borah, the powerful Republican Senator from 
Idaho, met with Hoover and forcefully championed Cardozo as the 
best appointment regardless of residence or religion. Cardozo's 
nomination was announced soon thereafter and the nomination 
cleared the Senate without dissent or discussion. To the surprise of 
no one-including President Hoover-Cardozo quickly joined Jus-
tices Brandeis and Stone on the liberal wing of the Court. 
To even the most casual observer of the Clarence Thomas pro-
ceedings, the often-told story of Cardozo's appointmenti must ap-
pear as a wondrous fairy tale of a land far away and a time long ago. 
Political savants as well as typical citizens have expressed distaste 
for the current system, and the chair of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee has suggested a reexamination of the entire process. None of 
the participants have distinguished themselves in the tradition of a 
Borah (or a Hoover, for that matter) and there can be little doubt 
• Associate Professor of Political Science, Boston University. 
I. The full story is recounted in Henry Abraham, Justices and Presidents 201-205 (Ox-
ford U. Press, 2nd ed. 1985). 
41 
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that the nominees do not measure up to a Cardozo. Certainly the 
entire process has become more contentious. 
From 1900 to 1968 only one nominee--John J. Parker in 
1930-was rejected by the Senate. The failure of Lyndon Johnson 
to secure confirmation for Abe Fortas as Chief Justice in 1968 was 
quickly followed by the defeats of Clement Haynesworth and G. 
Harrold Carswell. Before the defeat of Judge Bork, President Rea-
gan successfully elevated William Rehnquist to the chief justiceship 
but only after factious hearings and despite the fact that the new 
chief justice received more negative votes than any successful nomi-
nee in the twentieth century. Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, 
held this dubious record for only five years; Clarence Thomas easily 
shattered it in proceedings that quite literally stunned a nation. 
Therefore there is much to compel the conclusion that, for better or 
for worse, the nomination system in the last twenty-five years has 
undergone substantial changes. 
This essay seeks to provide some explanations for these devel-
opments and, in so doing, to supply a broader context for consider-
ing a good deal of the recent controversy regarding judicial 
nominations. The central argument is that the system of confirma-
tion of Supreme Court justices (and, to a lesser degree, lower court 
federal judges) is a far more democratic process than was the case 
decades ago. Profound changes in the structure of national electo-
ral politics coupled with a general transformation of the United 
States Senate and an expansion of judicial power have altered the 
nature of the politics of Supreme Court nominations. The tightly 
structured, leadership-controlled politics of deference to presiden-
tial leadership, which often characterized the nomination process 
during much of the twentieth century, no longer predominates. In 
its place are extraordinarily visible public proceedings, in which 
nominees to the Court are subject to the crucible of modem par-
ticipatory democracy. 
In the years following World War II, the Democratic party 
emerged as the dominant political party in the United States. Dem-
ocrats far outnumbered Republicans and Democratic hegemony ap-
peared secure at both the state and national levels. Even during the 
era of the Eisenhower presidency, the assumptions of Roosevelt and 
Truman shaped the contours of American politics.2 The over-
whelming defeat of Barry Goldwater in the 1964 presidential elec-
tion served as a stunning reminder of the fate that awaited those 
who challenged the fundamental principles of the New and Fair 
2. William E. Leuchtenberg, In the Shadow of FDR: From Harry Truman to Ronald 
Reagan (Cornell U. Press, 1983). 
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Deals. Writing during this period, Samuel Lubell characterized the 
Democratic party as the "sun" of the American political solar sys-
tem while relegating Republicans to an orbiting moon, "shin[ing] in 
the reflected radiance of the heat thus generated."J The coalition of 
minorities forged by Roosevelt-unionized labor, urban ethnics, 
middle class liberals, southern whites and northern blacks-com-
prised a remarkably broad social basis and formed the governing 
regime of post-World War II America. 
Although the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 marked the 
close of this period of Democratic dominance, the disintegration of 
the Roosevelt coalition had begun decades earlier. The causes of its 
demise are many: one of the most prominent was, and continues to 
be, race. A coalition anchored by southern whites and northern 
blacks contained the seeds of its own destruction. Roosevelt 
avoided the inherent contradiction within his own governing coali-
tion by frankly downplaying the issue of civil rights. As the na-
tional Democratic party became increasingly dependent on a large 
black voter turnout, however, the promotion of civil rights policy 
became an important campaign pledge of the party. This produced 
a decided backlash. In the 1950s for example, one out often identi-
fiers with the Democratic party was black; during the 1980s, it was 
one out offive.4 In 1952, seventy percent of white Southerners con-
sidered themselves to be Democrats; by 1984 this percentage had 
been cut in half.s Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the champion-
ing of civil rights policies designed to link blacks with the Demo-
cratic party produced the defection of southern whites. The once 
solid Democratic southland is now part of a distant political past; in 
1988 George Bush won the states of the old Confederacy with well 
over fifty-five percent of the popular vote. 
The migration of the civil rights movement from the rural 
South to northern cities further exacerbated the exodus of whites 
from the Democratic party. During the mid-1960s lower middle 
class white ethnics-another crucial component of the New Deal 
coalition-deserted the Democratic party, particularly at the na-
tional level. In the 1968 presidential campaign, George Wallace 
succeeded in drawing substantial support from this group and the 
1980 election produced a marked movement of blue collar workers 
to the Republican national ticket. Michael Dukakis did manage to 
counter this defection in 1988, but only by splitting the blue collar 
3. Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics 212 (Harper, 1952). 
4. See, Robert Weissberg, The Democratic Party and the Conflict over Racial Policy in 
Benjamin Ginsberg and Alan Stone, eds., Do Elections Matter? (M.E. Sharpe, 1986). 
5. Kenneth Janda, et al, The Challenge of Democracy 281 (Houghton Mifflin Co., 2d 
ed. 1989). 
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vote with George Bush. 6 Increasingly the ethnic, urban voter has 
identified the Democratic party with busing and the redistribution 
of benefits to black interests and the result has been a significant 
erosion of support from this traditional Democratic constituency.' 
Race, of course, was not the sole cause of the decomposition of 
the Roosevelt coalition. By the late 1960s, younger voters lacking a 
personal attachment to the party of Roosevelt began to replace the 
generation with direct exposure to the welfare policies of the New 
Deal. 8 Traditional Democratic groups-union members, blue col-
lar workers and Catholics-had undergone substantial changes in 
the years since the New Deal era. The Democratic party of Frank-
lin Roosevelt was an association of minorities drawn, for the most 
part, from the lower end of the economic spectrum. Over the last 
several decades, however, income distinctions between working and 
middle class have eroded and union membership has declined. In-
creasingly Americans have identified themselves as part of the well-
to-do middle class and this trend has produced a shrinking pool of 
voters who link themselves with the Democratic party. 
Responding to these developments, the party has sought a new 
direction by focusing attention on the burgeoning American middle 
class. A battle for the heart of the Democratic party rapidly devel-
oped between old line Democrats with roots in the union halls and 
Democratic clubs of the United States and a new generation "who 
had earned their political spurs in the civil rights movement and 
later in the anti-war movement."9 The balance of power in the 
party eventually shifted to the insurgents. Decidedly upper-middle 
class and college educated, these men and women achieved ex-
traordinary victories during this era on a broad range of political 
issues. Their success in ultimately forcing the withdrawal of troops 
from Southeast Asia and subsequent legislation limiting the power 
of the executive branch in the conduct of foreign affairs was testi-
mony to their emerging political power. But no less significant is 
the fact that most of the legislation in the last twenty years concern-
ing environmental protection, consumer protection, occupational 
health and safety, gender discrimination, nuclear energy restrictions 
as well as reforms of the Democratic party and Congress are the 
6. See New York Times/CBS News Poll in New York Times, Nov. 10, 1988, B6. 
7. See e.g. Robert R. Huckfeldt and Carol Kohfed, Race and the Decline of Class in 
American Politics (U. of Illinois Press, 1989). 
8. See e.g., Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba, and John R. Petrocik, The Changing Amer-
ican Voter (Harv. U. Press, 1976). 
9. Thomas Byrne Edsall, The New Politics of Inequality 49 (W. W. Norton, 1984) 
("The New Politics"). 
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product of what some have termed "the New Politics movement."JO 
The ability of New Politics groups to secure policy objectives is 
worthy of attention because these accomplishments took place de-
spite a marked lack of success in national electoral politics. 
Although the choice of George McGovern in 1972 as the party's 
presidential nominee heralded the emergence of a new force in the 
Democratic party, it also revealed the inability of this new wing to 
appeal to a broad national electorate. The reforms of the nominat-
ing procedures adopted by the Democrats in the early 1970s con-
tinue to skew the nominating processes of the party in favor of this 
new, elite constituency despite the persistent efforts of party profes-" 
sionals to redress the balance. Thus the Democratic party displays 
a dual personality as power and control vest in the liberal, elite wing 
of the party while electoral success at the national level depends on 
the turnout of more conservative low and moderate income 
voters. 11 
The cleavage within the Democratic party has weighty impli-
cations for the selection of federal judges. The Democratic party of 
Franklin Roosevelt linked its diverse interests through the politics 
of patronage, compromise and vote-trading. The coalition might 
endure only if the leadership commanded sufficient resources to sat-
isfy the needs of its constituent parts. Submerging ideological dif-
ferences beneath pragmatic concern with goods and services 
marked the New Deal coalition. An appointment to the federal 
bench was a resource that could be measured against other available 
benefits. Therefore even the occasional controversial, ideologically 
charged appointment could not be permitted to upset the commit-
ment to compromise and negotiation that held the party together. 
The developing fissures within the Democratic party, however, 
placed this understanding of the governmental process in serious 
jeopardy. Thomas Edsall, for example, has chronicled the elite 
newcomers' disdain for the politics of vote-trading and their sup-
port of the congressional reforms that ultimately pared the ability of 
the leadership to cut the deals and compromises that formed the 
lifeblood of the old coalition.12 More specifically, to the reform-
minded wing of the Democratic party a judicial appointment was 
not simply another instance of federal patronage. During the 1960s 
and 1970s the federal courts expanded the ability of groups and in-
terests to seek redress in the federal court system while simultane-
10. Benjamin Ginsberg and Martin Shefter, A Critical Realignment? The New Politics, 
the Reconstituted Right, and the 1984 Election in Michael Nelson, ed., The Elections of 1984 
(C. Q. Press, 1985). 
II. See Edsall, The New Politics Ch. I (cited in note 9). 
12. ld. at 46-49. 
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ously augmenting the array of remedies available to prevailing 
litigants. Groups broadly identified with the New Politics move-
ment have utilized the expanded focus of the federal judiciary to 
achieve their policy goals, in effect offsetting electoral defeats with 
litigation victories.•3 Nominations to the federal bench, particularly 
at the level of the Supreme Court, quickly became the type of no 
compromise event that the old coalition had sought so hard to 
avoid. 
As a result, the ante has dramatically increased in battles over 
appointments to the federal bench because a wide range of powerful 
interests has focused attention on the staffing of the federal judici-
ary. Democrats' mastery in counteracting electoral defeats through 
judicial decree gave rise to a reaction by components of the Republi-
can coalition. Those Republicans were frustrated by their inability 
to turn national electoral success into enactment of legislation that 
implemented desired social changes. Although a good deal of the 
recent Republican resurgence at the national level may be attributed 
to the appeal of "Reaganomics,"•• equally important has been the 
party's embrace of "family" values, a decision designed in part to 
appreciate the defection from the Democratic party by southern 
white Protestants and Catholic urban ethnics in the North. By way 
of example, political scientists Martin Shefter and Benjamin Gins-
berg have explored how the Republican right to life position helped 
"to politically unite, under Republican auspices, two religious 
groups that had been bitter opponents through much of American 
history."ts Despite significant electoral influence, movement con-
servatives have been frustrated by a federal judiciary that has re-
moved many important social decisions from legislative and 
executive control. 
For precisely this reason, many on the religious right were 
among the most avid supporters of Judge Bork and the most dis-
traught at his defeat. Mirroring the efforts of many groups within 
the Democratic party, leaders of several conservative organizations 
have promised increased participation in the nomination process.16 
With powerful, antagonistic interests in both parties converging on 
the selection of Supreme Court justices in very visible, organized 
13. The civil rights establishment, long connected to the Democratic party, has always 
considered the staffing of the judiciary to be of prime importance. The point here is that 
newer and often more politically powerful groups within the party now share this assessment. 
The net result is far greater participation in the confirmation process. 
14. Kevin P. Phillips, The Politics of Rich and Poor (Random House, 1990). 
15. Benjamin Ginsberg and Martin Shefter, Politics by Other Means: The Declining lm· 
portance of Elections in America 122 (Basic Books, 1990). 
16. See e.g. Patrick B. McGuigan and Dawn M. Weyrich, Ninth Justice: The Fight for 
Bork (Free Cong. Research and Education Fdn., 1990). 
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efforts to control the outcome, one senator described the process as 
"the worst kind of sleazy political operation."t7 Similiar hyperbole 
on the part of participants is currently the norm in large part be-
cause the nomination process is no longer the province of political 
and legal insiders. In fact, the disorderly contentious proceedings 
that have marked recent confirmations merely reflect the media-
dominated, participatory nature of modern American politics. 
The shifts in electoral politics that have occurred during the 
last three decades mirror changes in the United States Senate over 
approximately the same period. Although the explosion of group 
representation in Washington over the last forty years is well docu-
mented, less appreciated is that citizen groups concerned with 
broad quality of life issues have expanded at twice the rate of groups 
representing traditional economic interests (farmers, unions, etc.).ts 
Moreover, these groups have been particularly successful in devel-
oping alliances in the Senate. For the organized interest group, ac-
tive participation and leadership by a member of the Senate in the 
group's activities assure the concerns of the group a place on the 
national agenda as well as the attention of Washington policy mak-
ers and the media. From the perspective of the individual senator, 
championing the concerns of these interests provides the opportu-
nity for leadership in matters of national concern with the resulting 
national media attention. National visibility enhances the typical 
senate career.19 
The attention to personal publicity and leadership outside the 
institution of the Senate is a recent development. During the last 
twenty-five years, the norms of the U.S. Senate and the behavior of 
individual senators have undergone major alterations. The adjust-
ment in the operation of the institution and the style of its member-
ship has had profound, if perhaps unappreciated, consequences for 
the Senate's role in the appointment of federal judges. 
In 1960, the seminal work on the U.S. Senate described a hier-
archical institution, governed by widely shared norms, where influ-
ence and power varied directly with seniority within the 
institution.2o The committee system governed the Senate of the 
1950s. Committees controlled policymaking and, within commit-
tees, leaders chosen solely on the basis of seniority dominated the 
proceedings. Activity on the floor of the Senate was typically con-
17. Senator John C. Danforth, quoted in The New York Times, Oct. 9, 1991, A20. 
18. Jack Walker, The Origin and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America, 77 Am. 
Pol. Sci. Rev. 390-406 (1980). 
19. Barbara Sinclair, The Transformation of the US Senate (Johns Hopkins U. Press, 
1989) ("Transformation"). 
20. Donald Matthews, U.S. Senators and Their World (U. North Carolina Press, 1960). 
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strained; the norm of civility and respect for the expertise of com-
mittees precluded floor amendments and restricted important 
decisionmaking from the floor of the Senate. Hence policymaking 
in the Senate of the 1950s took place in the highly structured con-
fines of the committee system and leadership rested with a handful 
of senior senators. Virtually unchallenged was the norm of speciali-
zation. Senators were admonished to develop expertise within a 
narrow sphere of specialization and to reciprocate by respecting the 
expertise of others. A high value was placed on courtesy and reci-
procity; senators were expected to avoid personal attacks and to 
help colleagues when possible without undue regard for partisan-
ship. Indeed, as Professor Matthews noted, the highly structured 
"folkways" of the Senate precluded senators from exercising the ex-
traordinary powers of individual members under the Senate's rules; 
to do so, and thus to obstruct the operation of the institution, would 
be to violate the unwritten rules of the game and invite not coopera-
tion but retaliation from one's peers.21 
Within this highly structured world, newcomers were expected 
to serve an apprenticeship. A freshman senator likened his status to 
that of a child, to " 'be seen and not heard.' "22 His committee as-
signments were often those that senior senators found unattractive. 
Without exception, younger members were expected to play a sub-
servient role to more established colleagues. In the Senate of the 
1950s, the young senator inevitably lacked the resources to become 
a force within the institution; both the formal rules and the norms 
of the membership sustained the power of senior members. 
Observers characterized the Senate of this era as a "small 
town" where one got along by going along. Because many commit-
tee assignments reflected the reelection needs of individual senators, 
the focus on specialization did not necessarily impede a senate ca-
reer. Abiding by the norms of the institution promised even a new-
comer the aid, if needed, of his elder colleagues in a reelection 
battle. Furthermore, even the most junior senator might be be-
guiled by the prospect of someday assuming a leadership position. 
Without question the widely accepted norms of the Senate of the 
1950s did confine behavior, but the advantages of acceding to the 
constraints also typically outweighed those of being a maverick. 
The centralized leadership and hierarchical structure of the 
Senate help in explaining the extraordinary success rate of presi-
dents from 1900 through much of the 1960s in obtaining Senate 
confirmation of Supreme Court nominees. Apart from the rejection 
21. ld. at Ch. V. 
22. ld. at 93. 
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of Judge Parker in 1930, the Senate confirmed every Supreme Court 
nominee during that period. In the nineteenth century, the Senate 
rejected one of every three presidential nominations to the Court. 
The Senate of that era, however, was a far more partisan institution. 
With senators appointed by state legislatures-the seventeenth 
amendment was ratified in 1913-powerful state party leaders often 
dominated the Senate and used their power to funnel patronage to 
local party organizations. The typical senator of the nineteenth 
century had a secure local power base and little tolerance for cen-
tralized leadership within the institution. As a result, simple parti-
san opposition to the nominating president explained many of the 
negative votes during the nineteenth century.23 Furthermore, in 
such a highly partisan age in which many senators were the leaders 
of local political organizations, the unwritten rule of senatorial 
courtesy (which required the names of federal appointees to be re-
ferred to the senators from the states in which the appointees re-
sided and gave those senators, particularly if from the same party as 
the president, a virtual veto over the nomination) was respected 
even at the level of a Supreme Court appointment. 
The tightly structured, less partisan Senate of the twentieth 
century, in which reciprocity, courtesy and deference to leadership 
confined behavior no doubt enhanced the likelihood of a victorious 
nominee to the Court. To a significant degree, successful presiden-
tial strategy often consisted of the cultivation of a few key senators 
with the unquestioned ability to deliver the votes of their colleagues. 
Lyndon Johnson, for example, often spoke of a Senate consisting of 
a few "whales" and many "minnows."24 In any battle within the 
Senate, particularly in securing its advice and consent on appoint-
ments, the president needed only to negotiate with the appropriate 
"whales." The extensive resources ofthe executive branch could be 
employed to cultivate important votes without public scrutiny or 
participation. In the highly structured world of the Senate at mid-
twentieth-century, few senators would challenge the leadership. 
For the typical senator of this era, an appointment, even to the 
Supreme Court, was rarely critical to the interests of constituents 
and failure to support the leadership could have an adverse impact 
on the ability to achieve other goals. 
Lyndon Johnson's failure to secure Senate approval for the 
Fortas nomination in 1968 marked the end of the era of presidential 
control of the judicial selection process. By the late 1960s a break-
23. Abraham, Justices and Presidents at 40 (cited in note 1). 
24. Bruce Allen Murphy, Fonas: The Rise and Ruin of a Supreme Coun Justice 276 
(W. Morrow, 1988) ("Fonas"). 
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down in party leadership and the traditional norms of the Senate 
produced a new Senate populated by younger, more independent 
senators, compelled by a shrinking electorate to serve the particu-
larized needs of powerful constituency groups.2s Procedural re-
forms introduced earlier in the century-before 1929, for example, 
the Senate met in closed session to consider judicial nominees and it 
was not until 1939 that the practice of calling nominees to appear 
before the Senate judiciary committee began26.-would merge with 
changes in the "folkways" and the politics of the Senate to alter 
significantly the politics of judicial nominations. 
The most basic change was that of membership. Between 1958 
and 1965, twenty-three additional northern Democratic members 
entered the Senate. Decidedly more liberal than their elder col-
leagues--and less electorally secure--the career and policy goals of 
these senators were not necessarily advanced by compliance with 
Senate norms. Frustration with the traditional ways of the Senate 
coupled with sharpened ideological disputes between northern and 
southern members made the Senate of the early 1960s a contentious 
place. Unwilling to conform to the old model of apprenticeship, the 
new members demanded greater participation in the policy process. 
Floor activity increased as the northern newcomers often used this 
forum to pursue legislative goals.21 The new membership success-
fully campaigned to increase the number of subcommittees and, in 
effect, guarantee junior senators greater responsibility and author-
ity. The push by new members for increased influence within the 
institution culminated in the Legislative Reorganization Act of 
1970, which furthered the trend toward redistribution of power by 
restraining the power of committee chairs and limiting each mem-
ber of the Senate to service on no more than one prestigious 
committee. 
Even more important than the structural changes that empow-
ered junior members at the expense of their more senior colleagues 
was the erosion of the old norms of institutional behavior and the 
development of a new Senate style.2s A younger, more volatile elec-
torate, the growth of powerful interest groups, and the influence of 
mass media produced a new type of senator. The highly visible 
25. The best description of this appears in Sinclair, Transformation (cited in note 19). 
26. See, Paul Freund, Appointment of Justices: Some Historical Perspectives, 101 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1146 (1988). Until 1929, a two thirds vote of the Senate was required to open the 
Senate debate to public scrutiny. 
27. Barbara Sinclair also attributes a good deal of this increased floor activity to con-
servative reaction to the activism of the new membership. See, Sinclair, Transformation at 
43-44 (cited in note 19). 
28. See, Sinclair, Transformation at Ch. 6 (cited in note 19). 
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generalist replaced the behind-the-scenes specialist. No longer did a 
senator's committee assignment define the range of interests and in-
fluence. The rising costs of reelection campaigns encouraged sena-
tors to attract out-of-state campaign contributions by expanding, 
rather than narrowing, their scope of activities. The modern sena-
tor seeks national media exposure because power and influence is no 
longer simply a product of seniority coupled with the respect and 
admiration of one's peers but can be achieved outside the institution 
by becoming a highly visible spokesperson on a range of important 
national issues. 
One result is that while committees remain the critical arena of 
legislative activity, floor activity has increased, allowing senators, 
regardless of seniority or committee assignment, to participate ac-
tively in the policymaking process. The growth in staff personnel 
has permitted senators to engage in the more public and visible as-
pects of their work while the mundane, routine legislative work is 
delegated. The 1960s also witnessed the passing of the norm of ap-
prenticeship; by the 1970s first term senators arrived with a full leg-
islative agenda and the expectation, and resources, to play a major 
role in the legislative process. The folkways of the older Senate pre-
cluded individual senators from exercising their prerogative to in-
terfere with the day-to-day operations of the institution; in the more 
fluid, less constrained world of the modern Senate, members are far 
more willing to use the rules of the Senate to further personal or 
policy goals and even the most junior member is likely to engage in 
filibuster and extended debate. The consequence is a Senate made 
up of powerful, independent contractors in terms of their careers 
both as legislators and as candidates. 
The implications of these changes for the president's ability to 
successfully control nominations to the Court are enormous. The 
explicit division of labor of the Senate of the 1950s coupled with the 
disproportionate distribution of resources based on seniority en-
sured that the number of influential and consequential senators on 
any particular issue would be quite small. For the most part, lead-
ership was able to deliver votes and presidential courtship of key 
votes typically produced a sufficient majority to ensure a successful 
appointment to the Court. Thus one leading student of the appoint-
ment of federal judges noted that the defeat of John J. Parker in 
1930 was not due solely to the documented opposition of the 
NAACP and the AFL but also because President Hoover simply 
was unable to control influential senators within his own party.29 
The 1968 battle over the Fortas nomination signalled an abrupt 
29. See, Abraham, Justices and Presidents at 42 (cited in note 1). 
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departure from the old Senate style. Although the Fortas defeat 
can be attributed to several factors, Bruce Murphy's definitive biog-
raphy of Justice Fortas chronicles the significance of the challenge 
by a group of young Republicans to the authority of the Republican 
minority leader Everett Dirksen.JO President Johnson had secured 
Dirksen's pledge of support for Fortas and his promise to deliver 
Republican votes; Dirksen's failure to do so not only doomed the 
nomination but also testified to the declining influence of Senate 
leadership. The battles over Haynesworth and Carswell further evi-
denced the growing independence of individual senators and the im-
portance of broad, highly visible, national issues to even the most 
junior members of the Senate. The Bork nomination battle, fought 
for the most part not within the halls of Congress but in the na-
tional media, disclosed the extent to which the "whales" no longer 
controlled the "minnows." The spectacle of the Thomas nomina-
tion was simply the next, albeit giant, step in the evolution of this 
process. 
By the 1980s, the broad distribution of resources within the 
Senate coupled with the extraordinary independence of individual 
members presented the president with a far more difficult and com-
plex arena in which to operate. The current Senate is a more open 
and effective forum for the expression of diverse interests than was 
the case thirty years ago. In and of itself, this fact increases the 
likelihood of contentious battles over any presidential nomination. 
When these developments are linked to important changes in the 
nature of judicial power, however, the unique democratization of 
the process of judicial confirmation emerges. 
Perhaps it is fitting that the final ingredient in the constellation 
of forces that has reshaped the nomination process should emerge 
from the efforts of the Warren Court during the 1960s. It was, after 
all, the alleged excesses of that Court that powered much of the 
Republican rhetoric of that era and led to the unabashed efforts 
over the last several administrations to pack the Court with judicial 
conservatives. The Warren Court in effect changed the very nature 
of judicial power in the United States by redefining the constitu-
tional and discretionary limits on the exercise of federal judicial 
power and expanding the range of remedies available to successful 
litigants.3I These changes enhanced the ability of the judiciary to 
forge linkages with important constituency groups and to serve 
30. See, Murphy, Fortas at 299 (cited in note 24). 
31. This trend remained unabated during the years of the Burger Court. See e.g., Ber-
nard Schwartz, The Ascent of Pragmatism: The Burger Court in Action Ch. 2 (Addison-Wes-
ley Pub. Co., 1990). 
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these groups in much the same manner as the executive or legisla-
tive branch. Because the judiciary has developed the means to serve 
new constituencies, the appointment of federal judges is of vital con-
cern to a multitude of powerful and important political interests.32 
Considered from this perspective, the real revolution of the 
Warren era was to diminish the significance of the limitations on 
judicial power contained in Article III as well as the prudential lim-
itations established by an earlier Court which "insure[d] that the 
federal courts would not intrude into areas committed to other 
branches of government."33 The roots of many of the Warren 
Court's most notable achievements-for example, Brown v. Board 
of Education 34 and the move to nationalize the Bill of Rights--can 
be found in the decisions of the Hughes, Stone and Vinson Courts. 
But the Warren Court's almost casual disregard for threshold juris-
dictional and justiciability issues stands in stark contrast to the 
work of its predecessors. The examples are legion. In Baker v. 
Carr 3s the Court swept away the constraints of the political ques-
tion doctrine to confront the reapportionment controversy despite 
relatively recent precedent to the contrary.36 The abstention doc-
trine-articulated most forcefully by Justice Frankfurter in Rail-
road Commission v. Pullman Co. 37-provides that a federal court 
should decline to exercise jurisdiction when a constitutional issue 
rests on unsettled state law. During the Warren era, however, the 
abstention doctrine fell into disuse in the haste to secure federal 
court adjudication of important constitutional rights.3s During this 
era the rules governing standing to sue,39 mootness,40 and federal-
state comity,4t all designed to limit the exercise of federal judicial 
power, were relaxed as the Warren Court strove to expand judicial 
power to its constitutional limit. 
The willingness of the Court to disregard the prudential limits 
on judicial power altered the very nature of the federal judiciary. 
The freedom from a cramped view of its powers under Article III 
coupled with almost complete control over its own docket gave the 
Court the opportunity to compete for constituency support. This is 
32. Much of this analysis is drawn from Mark Silverstein & Benjamin Ginsberg, The 
Supreme Coun and the New Politics of Judicial Power, 102 Pol. Sci. Q. 371 (1987). 
33. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968). 
34. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
35. 369 u.s. 186 (1962). 
36. See e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
37. 312 u.s. 496 (1940). 
38. See e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfsiter, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). 
39. See Flast, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
40. See Winz v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass. Local153, 389 U.S. 463 (1968). 
41. See Dombrowski, 380 U.S. 479. 
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particularly the case in view of the expansion of judicial remedies 
that took place at the same time. Many commentators have noted 
the extent to which the judicial decrees of this era required detailed, 
specific and often affirmative actions on the part of losing parties. 42 
The trend continues, producing a federal judiciary with the power 
to detail the manner in which other governmental units will con-
duct their business and to provide successful litigants with remedies 
similar to those previously available only through the executive or 
legislative branches. 
Scholars have long recognized that groups unable to compete 
in the legislative or executive arena often tum to the courts for ac-
cess to government power.4J This "out-group" notion of interest 
litigation, however, fails to appreciate the extent to which the War-
ren Court altered the very nature of the federal judiciary's relation-
ship to the body politic.44 Relaxing the justiciability standards and 
expanding both the limits of class action4s and the range of reme-
dies available to group litigants benefited not only the poor and the 
weak but many more affluent, upper-middle class interests. By the 
late 1960s, an assortment of these interests--environmentalists, 
feminists, consumer groups-found the judiciary to be an important 
ally in the battle to secure their goals. For example, the develop-
ment of a substantial body of consumer and environmental protec-
tion law during the last three decades could not have taken place 
without an activist judiciary sympathetic to the litigation of claims 
in federal courts. Thirty years ago the groups seeking access to the 
federal courts may well have been predominantly the politically im-
potent; today, however, the liberalized limits on judicial power 
combined with new tools of judicial power have made the judiciary 
an attractive ally for a host of powerful constituent groups. 
These developments have created a more powerful and in-
dependent judiciary principally because they armed the judiciary 
with important political support to fight the battles with congres-
sional and executive branch opponents. The New Deal generation 
of liberals, for example, was apprehensive of a judiciary that con-
42. See, e.g., Donald L. Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy (Brookings Institution, 
1970); Abraham Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Interest Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 
1281 (1976). 
43. See Richard Cortner, Strategies and Tactics of Litigation in Constitutional Cases, 17 
J. of Pub. Law 287 (1968). 
44. For an interesting essay on the limitations of the "out-group" theory of interest 
group judicial activity, see Susan Olson, Interest Group Litigation in Federal District Court: 
Beyond the Political Disadvantage Theory, 52 J. of Pol. 854-82 (1990). 
45. In 1966, for example, the Supreme Court amended Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure to facilitate class actions. The significance of allowing claims that would be 
de minimis if asserted individually to be aggregated to group litigation can not be overstated. 
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stantly injected itself into the affairs of state without the political 
muscle to survive the inevitable political counter-attack.46 The 
modern judiciary, however, has greater resources both to shape 
public policy and to serve constituencies and, as a result, greater 
ability to fight such political battles. For example, the efforts to 
limit the power of the federal courts by groups opposed to busing or 
limitations on school prayer have been countered by a broad coali-
tion of interests that support an active judiciary.47 Many groups 
opposing Judge Bork's elevation to the Supreme Court did so pre-
cisely because of his cramped understanding of the role of the mod-
ern federal judiciary. A letter, authored by the general counsel of 
the Audubon Society and delivered to the members of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, asserting that Judge Bork's rulings in stand-
ing to sue cases would limit the ability of environmental groups to 
seek federal judicial relief typifies this development. 48 Similar fears 
motivated a wide range of groups that saw in Bork a substantial 
threat to their interest in an active and dynamic federal judicial sys-
tem. The same, of course, can be said for Clarence Thomas. 
During the last two decades powerful groups have found the 
federal courts to be a valuable institutional ally. Limiting the con-
straints on the access to the federal courts has opened the doors of 
the federal judiciary to an ever-widening array of interests. Innova-
tion in the nature and scope of the decrees issued by these courts 
has vastly increased the ability of the judiciary to serve these inter-
ests. The political implication of these developments is that potent 
political forces will fight to ensure that the judiciary continues to 
play an activist role in the development and implementation of na-
tional policy. 
CONCLUSION 
In the months following his failed appointment to the Supreme 
Court, Robert Bork toured the country. Speaking before various 
conservative and business groups, he asserted that his defeat was the 
product of the "first all-out political campaign with respect to a ju-
46. This is precisely why judicial liberals in the mold of Felix Frankfurter and Louis 
Brandeis placed such emphasis on the notion of justiciability; it permitted the judiciary to 
avoid battles it could not win without sanctioning results it found distasteful. The best ex-
pression of this notion of judicial liberalism appears in Alexander Bickel, The Least Danger-
ous Branch (Yale U. Press, 1986). 
47. Examples are detailed in Silverstein and Ginsberg, 102 Pol. Sci. Q. at 385-87 (cited 
in note 32). 
48. Described in Michael Pertshuk and Wendy Schaetzel, The People Rising: The Cam-
paign Against the Bork Nomination 184 (Thunder's Mouth Press, 1989). 
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dicial nominee in the country's history."49 Aside from the self-serv-
ing nature of much of his analysis, so Bork almost had it correct: the 
campaign to defeat him was an intensely political effort aimed at 
denying an outspoken critic of modern judicial activism a seat on 
the United States Supreme Court. Such an event, however, cannot 
be explained as simply a reaction to Bork and his jurisprudence; his 
defeat was merely an important step in a new confirmation system 
that has evolved over the last several decades. 
The demise of the Roosevelt coalition as the governing regime 
in post-New Deal America created a Democratic party split be-
tween the declining blue collar ethnic wing and an emerging elite 
wing with a dramatic focus on middle class lifestyle issues. To this 
elite wing of the Democratic party, the judiciary has been an impor-
tant agent in securing and protecting many policy gains of the last 
three decades. Not surprisingly, increased reliance on the judiciary 
by elements of the Democratic party produced a counterreaction 
among important forces within the Republican party resulting in 
added scrutiny of the judiciary by powerful elements within both 
parties. Changes in the institutional folkways and rules of the Sen-
ate have made individual senators far more sensitive to the demands 
of group interests while also diminishing the ability of the leader-
ship to present a united position on many issues. With power 
spread more broadly throughout the Senate and with many senators 
seeking visible, national issues to champion, conflicts over nominees 
to the federal bench, particularly the Supreme Court, are certain to 
arise. The changes in judicial power and the ability of the courts to 
serve the needs of powerful and important political groups virtually 
guarantee that these battles will be well financed and highly visible. 
The modern confirmation process that emerges resembles a 
continuing cat and mouse game between the Senate and the execu-
tive. The president, upon naming a candidate with an acceptable 
"conservative" judicial philosophy, mounts a campaign to outflank 
the inevitable opposition. Foes of the nominee in the Senate unite 
to devise a strategy which will focus attention on the threat posed 
by the candidate to an activist judiciary. An obvious consequence is 
that the stature of the candidate becomes, at best, a secondary con-
49. Quoted in Ethan Bonner, Battle for Justice: How the Bark Nomination Shook 
America 341 (W. W. Norton, 1989). 
50. Judge Bork does not to hesitate to characterize his defeat as the result of liberal 
elites' self-interested refusal to accept his disinterested, faithful-to-the-Framers interpretation 
of the Constitution and the role of the federal judiciary. Portraying the battle as essentially 
one between evil and good may serve to rally the faithful but has nothing to do with political 
reality. See Robert Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of America (Col-
lier Macmillan, 1990). 
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sideration. President Reagan undercut potential opposition to his 
initial nominee by naming the first woman to the Court; the fact 
that Sandra Day O'Connor presented a somewhat sparse resume for 
a potential Supreme Court Justice was lost in the general euphoria 
that a woman had finally been named to the Court. The White 
House responded to the Bork defeat by seeking less controversial 
and well-known candidates. In the bizarre world of modern confir-
mations, the mediocre record of Judge Souter was considered an 
important asset by the Bush Administration. Armed with a strat-
egy of refusing to engage the Senate Judiciary Committee in any 
meaningful discussion of his judicial philosophy and a quaint, as-
cetic demeanor, Souter won easy confirmation. Liberals in the Sen-
ate reacted to the reality of Justice Souter on the Supreme Court by 
vowing to deny confirmation in the future to any nominee who re-
fused to respond to the committee's inquiries. Flushed with the 
success of disengagement, however, the Bush White House contin-
ued the strategy but sought to undercut potential opposition by 
nominating Clarence Thomas, whose race and Horatio Alger life 
story diverted attention from his marginal professional 
qualifications. 
The lesson of history is that service on the Court may trans-
form individuals of limited stature or parochial background into gi-
ants of American law and politics. Notwithstanding the possibility 
of growth and development on the Court, however, the inescapable 
conclusion is that in the immediate future we are unlikely to see 
nominees with the stature of a Felix Frankfurter or the legendary 
experience and background of a Thurgood Marshall. These men 
ascended to the Court the product of a highly static process con-
trolled by political and legal elites. The system of confirmation to-
day is a far more democratic process, shaped by extraordinary 
public participation and media coverage. That, of course, is the de-
cided teaching of the Clarence Thomas proceedings. Thirty years 
ago sexual harassment was generally unacknowledged as a wrong; 
equally significant, in comprehending the events of the Thomas con-
firmation, however, is the fact that thirty years ago there were few 
organized women's groups and they had limited political impact. 
Moreover, women had little impetus for careful scrutiny of Court 
appointments. Today, women are not only politically organized but 
many consider appointments to the Court critical to the realization 
of policy goals. The obvious confusion and discomfort of many 
Senators as the Senate virtually imploded during the firestorm of 
the Thomas nomination is powerful testimony to the fact that the 
confirmation process is no longer within the control of traditional 
leadership elites. 
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It is within the often unseemly clash of opposing interests that 
the modern liberal-democratic state seeks to achieve rough consen-
sus on its most pressing and divisive issues. Given the develop-
ments of the last several decades, it should not be surprising that 
this struggle now defines the selection of our judges. From this per-
spective, the cries to depoliticize the process are not only naive but, 
perhaps, too hastily considered. The apparent decorum of the past 
was achieved at the expense of participation and accountability. 
Few who viewed the agony and personal tragedies of the Clarence 
Thomas proceedings can avoid the almost instinctive desire to re-
turn to less visible and contentious proceedings, but the stakes are 
too high and involve the vital interests of too many forces to seek 
refuge in the ways of the past. 
